REFLECTIONS ON PARTICIPATION: THE CASE OF SMALL IRRIGATION SCHEME REHABILITATION

The imperative of a participatory approach in land management projects, either by investment in irrigation or in anti-erosive measures, has already been demonstrated in various cases. It is the only guarantee of real ownership of the installations by the local beneficiaries that will use them but - with a view to the sustainability of the investments - should also ensure their maintenance.

Certainly, a participatory approach requires great efforts in the fields of communication, diagnosis and participatory planning, transparency, and seriousness of the two sides, i. e. the administration and the target population. These are preconditions for a successful and sustainable participatory approach. However, the other constituent element of a participatory approach is the contribution of beneficiaries to the investments in order to ensure ownership. The present text will mainly deal with this latter aspect.

How can beneficiaries contribute to the investment?

Participation can be understood in two different ways: one is participation in common work; the other is a (financial) contribution. These two may be seen as complementary.

The present paper will focus on the difficulties encountered with respect to the implementation of the second idea in Morocco. Until some ten years ago, the Moroccan government had accustomed the local population to a system of full government payment for all investments in rural infrastructure from design to implementation and sometimes even to their management. The change inherent in the participatory approach, which has been progressively adopted in the last ten years, therefore faces a certain number of obstacles. From the experience up to now various lessons can be learnt which we
would like to recall here.

Participation by labour is generally the way accepted best by farmers who can often offer time and labour but whose income levels make a financial participation difficult. As regards the totality of rehabilitation works of small and medium irrigation schemes, an important quantity of unskilled labour is required and can be provided by the farmers. At this level, three different types of commitment can be distinguished:

As regards the first type, an example of which can be found in the Moroccan programme "Fighting the Effects of Desertification", the contract concluded with the building contractor stipulates that the labour force has to be recruited locally. Farmers participate well in the work if they are paid. It can thus be assumed that the effort required on the part of the beneficiaries is relatively small. In addition, this situation is not very much appreciated by entrepreneurs who often already have their teams and complain that the farmers lack work efficiency. In fact, this option can only be adopted in cases where a temporary increase in employment at local level and thus the immediate - but temporary - increase in the revenues of the target group is part of the project objectives.

One could also imagine a mixed situation where the entrepreneur partially pays the benefiting farmers, for instance paying one day for two days worked.

However, it will be difficult to include such a provision in the contract to be concluded with the responsible enterprise and the obstacles mentioned above would arise in the same way.

Finally, one can also imagine that the farmers themselves are responsible for the implementation of that part of the work, which does not demand particular technical skills, for instance terracing, local transport of material, filling of gabions, etc. This case, which constitutes the major part of partnership contracts concluded by the agricultural administration in the Souss region (l'Office Régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole de Souss-Massa and Direction Provinciale de l'Agriculture d'Agadir) in irrigation schemes in mountainous regions seems to function quite well, provided that staff is backed by a competent, commanding person and the technical supervision of the construction site is ensured by the administration. The administration often lacks the required operating funds, a fact which, due to missing supervision, can entail important delays, i. e. unsuitable project modifications or misuse for the benefit of local influential persons.

The first type of participation (namely through labour) encounters the problem of measurement. It is actually difficult to assess the local population's contribution in labour. Even if one can make estimates according to the number of working days required multiplied with the cost of unskilled labour, one has to take into account that this labour does not have the same opportunity costs as skilled labour and that its effectiveness is not the same as real hired labour. Finally, the population could always take the view that it additionally provides board and lodging to the other members of the construction site, and participates thus ensuring guard duties and the transport of material.

A financial participation does not pose these quantification problems. As already assumed by numerous feasibility studies elaborated for rehabilitation works in the northern provinces, it is possible that farmers, at the level of an agricultural water users' association (WUA) pay a certain amount for their participation in the investment. However, experience has clearly shown that this contribution can only seldom be collected for several reasons.

One of the main reasons is that in Morocco there is no legal possibility for an association, or even individuals, to transfer money to the state within the framework of rehabilitation works for small and medium irrigation schemes. The provisions of the "Code des Investissements Agricoles " are only applicable to large-scale irrigation (irrigation schemes administered by offices). The contracts the state allocates to associations do therefore not detail these modalities at all. Moreover, it is extremely difficult, once the investment has been made, to collect a participation that was not subject to a clear decision.

In order to avoid this administrative problem, the idea of blocking an amount transferred by the farmers for the creation of an operating fund destined for the use and maintenance of the irrigation network could be interesting. However, regardless of the fact that this does not represent a contribution to the investment, this solution is subject to the difficulty of efficiently controlling the allocation of this fund once the work has been carried out.

One could also imagine the creation of a national fund like the one that exists for rural development (FDR) or the equipment of local communities (FEC). This fund to which the WUAs could contribute would allow funding a national policy. However, it would certainly be more difficult to make international donors contribute to this fund because they would thus no longer have direct control possibilities over their investment projects.

Apart from this administrative problem, the question is farmers' financial capacity. Many farmers will certainly have difficulties to make their contribution right from the start of the project. Consequently, whenever a financial contribution has been asked for, the effort has failed because the amount was either not transferred at all, or was paid in total to influential persons belonging to or having come from the village. This latter situation certainly does not constitute collective commitment and can lead to a fraudulent use of the project with the aim of pursuing political or any other interest.

The preferred use of local labour could enable the farmers to transfer their contribution to the project.

The use of credits, on the contrary, is more difficult to imagine: These farmers can only seldom furnish satisfying guarantees to cover the risk, and the micro-credit, because of its small size and its operation via small solidarity groups, does hardly seem appropriate for the situation. One could thus imagine that the state itself ensures the guarantee; however in this case, nothing would really push the indebted farmers to repay.

The appeal to the local authority would certainly not allow managing the totality of recalcitrant people. Moreover, the management of a credit for a very large number of farmers will also entail management problems. Finally, a direct loan by the state would mean the creation of a kind of tax which would be cumbersome to implement and difficult, if not impossible, to recover.

However, if farmers, who are sceptical towards projections promising them an increase in revenues, refuse to commit themselves financially, even in a symbolic way, it will be difficult to justify a public investment whose economic benefit is too hypothetic in the view of those who are the most familiar with the conditions on site.

Another aspect that merits increased reflection is the definition of the term "executing agency" in the context of community financing or co-financing. It is generally accepted that the institution/organisation providing the money has the power to decide upon its use. This implies that the beneficiaries must have the power of vote and veto for the management of work contracts (agreement on the tender dossier, selection of offers, award of contract, co-signature of the contract with the company, acceptance of works). The legal framework for such co-management still has to be created.

The setting up of partnership contracts between the beneficiaries and the administration represents a last possibility where each partner commits himself to the implementation of a part of the works. In this precise case, the local population, apart from unskilled labour, provides skilled labour and the transport of material whereas the administration provides the material, the technical recruitment, and the required studies. Within the framework of Moroccan projects for the construction of rural roads or the programme for the rehabilitation of potable water, the beneficiaries commit themselves to building a part of the installation; often a part that requires only limited technical skills. This contribution thus frequently includes a financial participation to pay skilled workers, material and transport. This solution actually only permits starting work financed by the state after the work to be done by the beneficiaries has been finished. However, in order to ensure that the enterprise responsible for the follow-up works is not "taken as hostage" (case of beneficiaries refusing to carry out their part), one has to wait until the end of this first step before concluding the contracts, i. e. before publishing the tender dossier, a fact that may result in long delays.

In view of these results, the following conclusions may be drawn:
First of all, how much would the beneficiaries have to pay? This question refers back to the question of the intended objective. Given that the participatory approach intends to improve the felt ownership of installations by the beneficiaries, it can be assumed that a symbolic amount would be sufficient, provided that it represents a real effort for the population. In this context, an amount of 10 per cent, which is mentioned in various project approaches, may be sufficient.

Once this percentage has been agreed upon, it seems to be important that an investment approach guaranteeing equal treatment in different local settings is ensured, if possible at national level:

Obvious inequality tends to discourage those volunteers who see that their more cunning or patient neighbours get more favourable conditions, which is already the case in the Moroccan programme "Fighting the Effects of Desertification". In the same way, in order to avoid any possible extortion, it is necessary for the administration to have a large number of potential projects and to select only those projects for which the population shows real willingness to contribute and is ready to follow the rules of the game.

Afterwards, this contribution has to be placed in a contractual context to which the State and the farmers are committed. If it is desirable that beneficiaries transfer their contributions before the State does, this demands that - in turn - implementation is quick, in conformity with commitments, and ensuring great transparency.

In order for the financial contribution to be an efficient participatory instrument, it has to be an integral part of an approach that really takes into account expectations and needs of the population. Great flexibility has to be ensured which can cater for more ambitious demands resulting from adapted contributions. This approach presupposes that the administration, which ensures the regular contact with the local population during the whole project period, has the required means of operation as well as a sufficient autonomy to manage the project.

If we take a closer look at the practical situation in the agricultural administration of Morocco, it seems quite unlikely that it has the required means of operation as well as the enthusiasm, the personal commitment and the management flexibility required to successfully apply a participatory approach together with the required financial contribution. Although this approach is desirable, we propose to fall back upon a practice-oriented approach: a partnership approach. If taken seriously, this approach demands transparency of planning and contractual arrangements for investments and works, and, of course, the respect of commitments made by both partners, aspects that should be completely normal in a participatory approach.

Finally it is necessary to remember that the participatory approach should never be limited to a financial contribution, as this is not always compatible with the objectives of rural development or the sustainable stabilisation of a population. The financial participation in itself can be the origin of bad ownership. This critical conclusion, however, should only lead to work on the basis of the greatest possible coordination with the local population. The local population has in effect to learn to internalise the present development, and will then be able to achieve a more autonomous, democratic development.